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Philosophy at the Beginning of the
21st Century
BRUCE A. LITTLE
Résumé: À la dernière moitié du 20 e  siècle, la post-
modernité a rejeté entièrement la notion de réalité objective
et celui de vérité. On doit s'en souvenir que la vérité en
dépend de ce qu’il montre et s'il n'y avait aucune réalité
objective il n'y avait aucune vérité non plus. Mais
aujourd’hui, au commencement du 21e siècle, est survenue
une nouvelle vue appelée la post post -modernité qui est un
retour subtil à la modernité et qui tende trouver des choses
fermes dans la réalité et des certitudes dans la pensée. Ainsi,
ce courent reconnaît que notre expérien ce nous enseigne qu'il
y a un monde réel qui existe indépendamment de nous,
indépendamment de nos expériences, de nos pensées et de
notre langue. À ce moment il semble qu'il y a une
opportunité de revenir à une position réaliste, qui a du sens
tant dans la science que dans la théologie. Elle fournit une
vision du monde qui se veut correspondante à la réalité,
cohérente en lui-même et capable à répondre
systématiquement aux questions de la vie.
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By the middle part of the 20 th century, there was a growing
discontent with modernity. The claim was that modernity had
promised much more that it could deliver with its scientism or
positivism. The idea that it was possible to have absolute certainty
through the scientific method was seriously doubted. The
conclusion by a number (such as Foucault, Derrida, Rorty) was
that reality was not such that it could be known in some objective
way as if one could read the truth of nature right off the page as
there was no reality in a objective sense. Reality did not exist “out
there” but was created by each community. The Enlightenment
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had forwarded the idea of naïve reality, that we could look at
reality and make truth statements about it that were 100%
accurate. Of course, Thomas Kuhn in his influential ideas of
paradigm shift encouraged thoughts away from this naïve realism
but his view led to the idea that there were many realities. From
this developed what has been known as perspectivalism where
one’s own perspective is what determines what is real so that, in
the end, there are as many realities as there are perspectives. And
when a different paradigm was discovered, it did not make the old
paradigm wrong, just different.
One might have predicted this epistemologic al development
based on Enlightenment thinking simply because it denied the
universal— in a word, that which transcends experience.
Concerning this, Richard Weaver wrote in 1948 warning that: “The
denial of universals carries with it the denial of everythi ng
transcending experience. The denial of everything transcending
experience means inevitably – though ways are found to hedge on
this – the denial of truth.”1 The denial of truth, argued Weaver,
leads to relativism where man is the measure of all things. This
growing confusion over reality and truth led a number of thinkers
to challenge the basic premise of modernity, namely, that there is a
reality out there to be known. In fact, the conclusion by many was
that the search for epistemological certainty had  failed because it
was built on the assumption that there was a reality independent
of the mind. What followed this critique of modernity (and its
assumptions) has been called post modernity which claimed that
the assumption of modernity was wrong. That is , that there could
be a unified theory of knowledge --- that truth statements could be
determined to be right or wrong by a correspondence theory of
truth.
In the latter half of the 20 th century, post modernity
jettisoned the notion of truth (and objectiv e reality) altogether, that
1
 Richard Weaver,  Ideas Have Consequences , Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1948, p. 4.
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is, truth as it related to some objective reality “out there” so to
speak. It must be remembered that truth depends on that to which
it points. If there were no objective reality to which a truth -claim
pointed, then there was no  truth either. This in some way
contributed to the more nihilistic view of life (built on the denial of
God’s existence) that is a life without meaning. This was the
practical outworking of the loss of the universal ---
meaninglessness---as particulars are never strong enough to
ground meaning. The reason for this is that nature is always
changing. If nature is the grounding of truth, then truth is relative
as meaning is determined by the relationship of one particular has
to another. In this case, when one p articular changes, then so does
meaning.
By the latter part of the 20 th century, there was a growing
chorus of voices challenging post modernity. It did not take long
for those who labored in the physical sciences to strenuously object
to the post modern view of reality. After all, if there were no reality
independent of the mind, then how could anyone do anything
meaningful in the name of science? If reality is in flux and
ambiguous, then science was subverted as science requires
stability to reality.
The postmodernist view saw the epistemological failure in
modernity’s confidence in legitimizing truth -value claims by
reason, but did not understand properly why it failed, which was
the loss of the transcendent or the universal. While post
modernity’s challenge to modernity at this point seemed right,
unfortunately, it failed to understand the cure because it
misdiagnosed the aliment of the Enlightenment. Consequently, it
attempted a solution to modernity while maintaining the two
crippling assumptions of modernity. One was the epistemological
denial of universals (essentialism) and the other was the corollary
assumption of naturalism. Both of these led to the epistemological
impotence of modernity, but were still embraced by
postmodernism.
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The challenges to post modernity were soon sounded by
those in the physical sciences. Edward O. Wilson (biologist at
Harvard), a proponent of post post modernism writes of the
postmodernists,
“Reality, they [postmodernists] propose, is a state
constructed by the mind, not  perceived by it. In the most
extravagant version of this constructivism, there is no "real"
reality, no objective truths external to mental activity, only
rivaling versions disseminated by ruling social groups. Nor
can ethics be firmly grounded, given tha t each society
creates its own codes for the benefit of the same oppressive
forces”1
Here even a naturalist clearly understands, even if he cannot
understand why, how the ideas of post modernism lead to the
ethical relativism hence moral relativism.
By the close of the 20 th century, a new view arose called post
post modernity which is a subtle return to modernity. In Paul
Kurtz’s critique of post modernism’s failure he makes a case for
returning to the Enlightenment. He writes:
“Scientific naturalism holds a form of nonreductive
materialism; natural processes and events are best
accounted for by reference to material causes.” 2
The affirmation is that
“Scientific naturalism enables human beings to construct a
coherent worldview disentangled from metaphysi cs or
theology and based on the sciences.” 3
In one statement, post post modernism shows that it is
following the thinking of the Enlightenment. That is, it remains
hostile to the idea of anything transcending experience, but still
1
 Edward O.Wilson, Free Inquiry Fall, 1998.
2
 Paul Kurtz (drafter), Humanist Manifesto 2000 , Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2000 , p.
25.
3 Ibid., p. 24.
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claims it is possible to  construct a coherent worldview from the
particulars alone.
Edward O. Wilson, speaking for post post modernism,
writes,
“Science offers the boldest metaphysics of the age. It is a
thoroughly human construct, driven by the faith that if we
dream, press to discover, explain, and dream again, thereby
plunging repeatedly into new terrain, the world will
somehow come clearer and we will grasp the true
strangeness of the universe.” 1
Still working from the two -circle theory of truth, both post
modernism and post  post modernism fail to see the fundamental
flaw in Enlightenment epistemology. Post modernity simply gives
up the notion of some totalizing metanarratives, while post post
modernity believes it can still be done legitimately from science
with some modifications of modernity. However, as long as the
assumptions of the Enlightenment remain the starting point, there
is little hope of moving beyond the present epistemological
dilemma. Modernity has demonstrated that one cannot build a
universal from a careful study of the particulars. Any such attempt
is always defeated by skepticism and limited epistemic access to all
the facts.
One could argue that the major point of the critique of post
modernism (and post post modernism) is its a priori commitment
to naturalism with its corollary dismissal of the possibility of an
infinite personal God who could speak to man, a God who stands
above nature, a God who created nature and who has spoken to
man in a way that man can understand. That is to say, the
transcendent One who provides a grounding for meaning in the
study of particulars. Still, post post modernity boasts of a way out
of the epistemological and moral relativism of post modernity and
it is back to the Enlightenment. Of course they claim it will be
1
 Edward O. Wilson, Concilience: The Unity of Knowledge , New York, Alred A. Knoff,
Inc., 1998, p. 12.
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different this time around. Paul Kurtz explains (as he admits) that
Enlightenment’s role of “Reason as an absolute rather than as a
tentative and fallible instrument of human purpose was
overdrawn.”1 What he proposes to change is precisely this notion.
He suggests that reason, while reliable, is still fallible. Of course,
that is right and that is a good start. However, the failure to see the
importance of the universal/transcendent, that which is above
experience, will also subvert his attempts to avoid the same
conclusion of modernity. If consistent to the end, he will have to
choose either to accept skepticism or return to the scientism of
modernity.
It is, in fact, this tenacious commitment to naturalism that
will deliver post post modernity to the reductionistic  notions of
modernity—the clear failure of modernity. Edward O. Wilson
actually hopes that
“We are approaching a new age of synthesis, when the
testing of consilience [coherence] is the greatest of all
intellectual challenges. Philosophy, the contemplatio n of the
unknown, is a shrinking dominion. We have the common
goal of turning as much philosophy as possible into
science.”2
There is a belief that recognition of the universal is unwanted and
unnecessary on the one hand, and that scientific naturalism is
sufficient to ground one’s knowledge claims one the other hand.
As Paul Kurtz explains:
“Scientific naturalism enables human beings to construct a
coherent worldview disentangled from metaphysics or
theology and based on the sciences.” 3
However, in the critique of postmodern, there is another
possibility which has been noised about in the background and is
1
 Paul Kurtz, Humanist Manifesto 2000, Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2000, p. 23.
2Edward. O. Wilson., Concilience: The Unity of Knowledge , p. 11-12
3
 Paul Kurtz, Humanist Manifesto 2000, Amherst, Prometheus Books, 2000, p. 24.
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now gaining a growing number of adherents. In an edited work
titled After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism 1 there
is a suggestion that there is a middle way between the naïve realism
of modernity (foundationalism: the idea that there are
foundational beliefs that rest on no other beliefs and, hence, are
indubitable) and the relativism of post modernity. This middle way
is called critical realism. In a naturalistic universe, or “time -bound”
universe, there is no possibility of God or that God has spoken ---
no possibility of universals and no possibility of the transcendent –
no need of essences. That is, that there is no truth from “out there”
because there is no reality “out there”. Critical realism on the other
hand, agrees with modernity that there is a reality out there, but
argues that it is not known with absolute certainty. That is to say:
“The external world is real. Our knowledg e of it is partial
but can be true. Science is a map or model. It is made up of
successive paradigms that bring us to closer approximation
of reality and absolute truth. Each field in science presents a
different blueprint of reality. These are complimenta ry to
one another. Integration is achieved, not by reducing them
all to one model, but by seeing their relationship. Each gives
us partial insights into reality.” 2
There is only one reality and it is knowable by man, however, it
cannot be known with absolute certainty, but it can be known with
a high degree of confidence. It claims that while man’s cognitive
faculties are fallible, they are reliable. The difference between
critical realism and post post modernity is that critical realism
allows for the universal, that which transcends experience. In
addition, and importantly so, critical realism recognizes that one
method is not sufficient for knowing all reality. That is, the nature
of what is known determines what can be known about the object
1
 Jose Lopez and Gary Potter (eds.), After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical
Realism, London, The Althone Press, 2001.
2Paul G. Hiebert, Missiological Implications of Epistemological Shifts: Affirming Truth
in a Modern/Postmodern World ,  Harrisburg, Trinity Press International, 1999, p. 37.
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and how it can be known. The scientific method is capable of
making knowledge claims about nature, but theology can make
knowledge claims about that which transcends experience.
Critical realism is promoted by both scientists and
theologians: scientists such as John Polkinghorne, Roy Bhasker,
Author Peacock, and theologians such as Alister McGrath, Bernard
Lonergan, Ben Meyer, Kevin Vanhoozer. It is interesting to note
that Catholic theologian Bernard Lonergan was writing about
critical realism in the mid part of th e 20th century when a scientist,
Michael Polanyi was coming to the same conclusion. Speaking
about the nature of reality, Alister McGrath  suggests that there are
different aspects to reality and in this way ontology determines
epistemology. He writes:
“These differing modes of interplay and representation are
governed by the nature of the strata of reality under
investigation, each of which demands its own distinctive
mode of engagement. To set up a principle that is of decisive
importance throughout this  project: ontology (the way things
are) determines epistemology (the way things are known) . The
nature of reality is such that certain things can only be
known to a certain extent, and in a certain way – and that is
the reality of the situation. We are not  in a position to
determine whether and how things may be known; that is
decided by the things themselves.” 1
What this means, according to J. Wentzel van Huysteen (Princeton
University), is that:
“Critical realism, of course, is neither a theological no r a
scientific thesis; it is a philosophical, an epistemological,
thesis about the goals of scientific knowledge and the
implications of theoretical models in science. Hence it
should not be seen as a theory about truth, but rather a
1
 Alister McGrath, The Science of God, Grand Rapids,  Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co., 2004, p. 107.
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theory about the epistemic values that shape scientific
rationality. In theology, critical realism should be seen as a
response to the question: ‘What sort of philosophical
account is possible of the aims and the structure of
religious/theological reflection and of the epistemi c attitudes
presupposed by this kind of reflection.’” 1
Critical realism affirms we have a direct perceptual access to
our world, that there is a reality that exists independent of the
mind. That is the realism part. The critical part is that it believes
our cognitive faculties are reliable, but not infallible. Furthermore,
it is unwarranted to say that all reality can be grasped by the
methods of science as that would fall into the mistake of
reductionism in modernity. Because data is processed by the
subject, there is a subjective element to the knowing process —
subjective, not relative. As a knower, man realizes that he is a
subject in the knowing process and his processing of information is
influenced by his worldview, or what we might call a web of
beliefs. Therefore, the intellectually virtuous person does all he can
to assure that his epistemic claims have passed a critical review
using both the coherent and correspondence tests for truth. Such
tests for truth are possible, according to critical realis m, because
there is a reality independent of the mind (call it objective reality).
The fact that post post modernity failed on the practical
level is that it is impossible to live and have meaning in the world
give the post modern paradigm. The reason for modernity’s failure
is lodged in the fact it eventually dismissed the notion of
universals, or the transcendent. Critical realism logically
recognizes at least the possibility of universals (in some places it is
actually called transcendental realism) whic h in turn brings
theology back into the discussion of knowledge claims. Because it
is critical realism, it avoids the epistemological arrogance of
modernity. Because it is critical realism it avoids the totalizing
1
 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen , Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology , Grand Rapids,
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997 , p. 40.
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relativism of post modernity. As a form of  realism it acknowledges
there is a reality independent of the mind and of the community
that can be known even if it is known imperfectly --yet truly.
Within critical realism there is an acceptance of certain
anthropological givens. Although I would not su ggest that John
Searle is a critical realist (he is an anti -dualist), he does list what
seems undeniable on intuitive grounds at least that certain facts are
obvious. He suggests there are four, what he calls default
positions:
1. We have direct perceptua l access to that world through
our senses, especially touch and vision.
2. Words in our language, words like rabbit or tree, typically
have reasonably clear meanings. Because of their meanings, they
can be used to refer to and talk about real objects in t he world.
3. Our statements are typically true or false depending on
whether they correspond to how things are, that is, to the facts in
the world.
4. Causation is a real relation among objects and events in
the world, a relation whereby one phenomenon, the cause, causes
another, the effect. 1
In other words, our experience teaches us that there is a real
world that exists independently of us, independently of our
experiences, our thoughts, and our language. At this moment it
appears there is a window of opportunity to return to a realist
position, one that misses the mistakes of both modernity and post
modernity and makes sense of both science and theology. In
addition, it provides a worldview paradigm that makes sense of
our world practically, which is t o say, it corresponds to reality, is
coherent within itself, has explanatory power and answers the
questions of life consistently.
1
 John Searle, Mind, Language, and Society, New York, Basic Books, 1999 pbk, p. 10.
